2.5 CVE-2023-37395
IBM Aspera Faspex 5.0.0 through 5.0.7 could allow a local user to obtain sensitive information due to improper encryption of certain data.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37395
Categories
CWE-327 : Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol. Automated methods may be useful for recognizing commonly-used libraries or features that have become obsolete. This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. Ensure that the design allows one cryptographic algorithm to be replaced with another in the next generation or version. Where possible, use wrappers to make the interfaces uniform. This will make it easier to upgrade to stronger algorithms. With hardware, design the product at the Intellectual Property (IP) level so that one cryptographic algorithm can be replaced with another in the next generation of the hardware product. Carefully manage and protect cryptographic keys (see CWE-320). If the keys can be guessed or stolen, then the strength of the cryptography itself is irrelevant. When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks. SCADA-based protocol supports a legacy encryption mode that uses Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) in ECB mode, which leaks patterns in messages and cannot protect integrity Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) uses a protocol with a cryptographically insecure hashing algorithm for passwords. Product uses "ROT-25" to obfuscate the password in the registry. product only uses "XOR" to obfuscate sensitive data product only uses "XOR" and a fixed key to obfuscate sensitive data Product substitutes characters with other characters in a fixed way, and also leaves certain input characters unchanged. Attackers can infer private IP addresses by dividing each octet by the MD5 hash of '20'. Product uses DES when MD5 has been specified in the configuration, resulting in weaker-than-expected password hashes. Default configuration of product uses MD5 instead of stronger algorithms that are available, simplifying forgery of certificates. Product uses the hash of a hash for authentication, allowing attackers to gain privileges if they can obtain the original hash.
References
CPE
REMEDIATION
EXPLOITS
Exploit-db.com
id |
description |
date |
|
No known exploits |
POC Github
Other Nist (github, ...)
CAPEC
Common Attack Pattern Enumerations and Classifications
id |
description |
severity |
20 |
Encryption Brute Forcing
An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext. Determine the ciphertext and the encryption algorithm. Perform an exhaustive brute force search of the key space, producing candidate plaintexts and observing if they make sense. |
Low |
459 |
Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate
An adversary exploits a weakness resulting from using a hashing algorithm with weak collision resistance to generate certificate signing requests (CSR) that contain collision blocks in their "to be signed" parts. The adversary submits one CSR to be signed by a trusted certificate authority then uses the signed blob to make a second certificate appear signed by said certificate authority. Due to the hash collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob works just as well in the second certificate. The net effect is that the adversary's second X.509 certificate, which the Certification Authority has never seen, is now signed and validated by that Certification Authority. [Craft Certificates] The adversary crafts two different, but valid X.509 certificates that when hashed with an insufficiently collision resistant hashing algorithm would yield the same value. [Send CSR to Certificate Authority] The adversary sends the CSR for one of the certificates to the Certification Authority which uses the targeted hashing algorithm. That request is completely valid and the Certificate Authority issues an X.509 certificate to the adversary which is signed with its private key. [Insert Signed Blob into Unsigned Certificate] The adversary takes the signed blob and inserts it into the second X.509 certificate that the attacker generated. Due to the hash collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob is valid in the second certificate. The result is two certificates that appear to be signed by a valid certificate authority despite only one having been signed. |
Very High |
473 |
Signature Spoof
An attacker generates a message or datablock that causes the recipient to believe that the message or datablock was generated and cryptographically signed by an authoritative or reputable source, misleading a victim or victim operating system into performing malicious actions. |
|
475 |
Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation
An adversary exploits a cryptographic weakness in the signature verification algorithm implementation to generate a valid signature without knowing the key. |
High |
608 |
Cryptanalysis of Cellular Encryption
The use of cryptanalytic techniques to derive cryptographic keys or otherwise effectively defeat cellular encryption to reveal traffic content. Some cellular encryption algorithms such as A5/1 and A5/2 (specified for GSM use) are known to be vulnerable to such attacks and commercial tools are available to execute these attacks and decrypt mobile phone conversations in real-time. Newer encryption algorithms in use by UMTS and LTE are stronger and currently believed to be less vulnerable to these types of attacks. Note, however, that an attacker with a Cellular Rogue Base Station can force the use of weak cellular encryption even by newer mobile devices. |
High |
614 |
Rooting SIM Cards
SIM cards are the de facto trust anchor of mobile devices worldwide. The cards protect the mobile identity of subscribers, associate devices with phone numbers, and increasingly store payment credentials, for example in NFC-enabled phones with mobile wallets. This attack leverages over-the-air (OTA) updates deployed via cryptographically-secured SMS messages to deliver executable code to the SIM. By cracking the DES key, an attacker can send properly signed binary SMS messages to a device, which are treated as Java applets and are executed on the SIM. These applets are allowed to send SMS, change voicemail numbers, and query the phone location, among many other predefined functions. These capabilities alone provide plenty of potential for abuse. |
High |
97 |
Cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis is a process of finding weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms and using these weaknesses to decipher the ciphertext without knowing the secret key (instance deduction). Sometimes the weakness is not in the cryptographic algorithm itself, but rather in how it is applied that makes cryptanalysis successful. An attacker may have other goals as well, such as: Total Break (finding the secret key), Global Deduction (finding a functionally equivalent algorithm for encryption and decryption that does not require knowledge of the secret key), Information Deduction (gaining some information about plaintexts or ciphertexts that was not previously known) and Distinguishing Algorithm (the attacker has the ability to distinguish the output of the encryption (ciphertext) from a random permutation of bits). An attacker discovers a weakness in the cryptographic algorithm or a weakness in how it was applied to a particular chunk of plaintext. An attacker leverages the discovered weakness to decrypt, partially decrypt or infer some information about the contents of the encrypted message. All of that is done without knowing the secret key. |
Very High |
MITRE
Techniques
id |
description |
T1036.001 |
Masquerading: Invalid Code Signature |
T1553.002 |
Subvert Trust Controls:Code Signing |
© 2022 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. |
Mitigations
id |
description |
T1036.001 |
Require signed binaries. |
© 2022 The MITRE Corporation. Esta obra se reproduce y distribuye con el permiso de The MITRE Corporation. |
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