CVE-2025-2861
SaTECH BCU in its firmware version 2.1.3 uses the HTTP protocol. The use of the HTTP protocol for web browsing has the problem that information is exchanged in unencrypted text. Since sensitive data such as credentials are exchanged, an attacker could obtain them and log in legitimately.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2861
Categories
CWE-319 : Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
The product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors. Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.) Before transmitting, encrypt the data using reliable, confidentiality-protecting cryptographic protocols. When using web applications with SSL, use SSL for the entire session from login to logout, not just for the initial login page. When designing hardware platforms, ensure that approved encryption algorithms (such as those recommended by NIST) protect paths from security critical data to trusted user applications. Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. Configure servers to use encrypted channels for communication, which may include SSL or other secure protocols. Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) sends sensitive information in plaintext, including passwords and session tokens. Building Controller uses a protocol that transmits authentication credentials in plaintext. Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) sends password in plaintext. Passwords transmitted in cleartext. Chain: Use of HTTPS cookie without "secure" flag causes it to be transmitted across unencrypted HTTP. Product sends password hash in cleartext in violation of intended policy. Remote management feature sends sensitive information including passwords in cleartext. Backup routine sends password in cleartext in email. Product transmits Blowfish encryption key in cleartext. Printer sends configuration information, including administrative password, in cleartext. Chain: cleartext transmission of the MD5 hash of password enables attacks against a server that is susceptible to replay (CWE-294). Product sends passwords in cleartext to a log server. Product sends file with cleartext passwords in e-mail message intended for diagnostic purposes.
References
CPE
REMEDIATION
EXPLOITS
Exploit-db.com
| id |
description |
date |
|
| No known exploits |
POC Github
Other Nist (github, ...)
CAPEC
Common Attack Pattern Enumerations and Classifications
| id |
description |
severity |
| 102 |
Session Sidejacking
Session sidejacking takes advantage of an unencrypted communication channel between a victim and target system. The attacker sniffs traffic on a network looking for session tokens in unencrypted traffic. Once a session token is captured, the attacker performs malicious actions by using the stolen token with the targeted application to impersonate the victim. This attack is a specific method of session hijacking, which is exploiting a valid session token to gain unauthorized access to a target system or information. Other methods to perform a session hijacking are session fixation, cross-site scripting, or compromising a user or server machine and stealing the session token. [Detect Unprotected Session Token Transfer] The attacker sniffs on the wireless network to detect unencrypted traffic that contains session tokens. [Capture session token] The attacker uses sniffing tools to capture a session token from traffic. [Insert captured session token] The attacker attempts to insert a captured session token into communication with the targeted application to confirm viability for exploitation. [Session Token Exploitation] The attacker leverages the captured session token to interact with the targeted application in a malicious fashion, impersonating the victim. |
High |
| 117 |
Interception
An adversary monitors data streams to or from the target for information gathering purposes. This attack may be undertaken to solely gather sensitive information or to support a further attack against the target. This attack pattern can involve sniffing network traffic as well as other types of data streams (e.g. radio). The adversary can attempt to initiate the establishment of a data stream or passively observe the communications as they unfold. In all variants of this attack, the adversary is not the intended recipient of the data stream. In contrast to other means of gathering information (e.g., targeting data leaks), the adversary must actively position themself so as to observe explicit data channels (e.g. network traffic) and read the content. However, this attack differs from a Adversary-In-the-Middle (CAPEC-94) attack, as the adversary does not alter the content of the communications nor forward data to the intended recipient. |
Medium |
| 383 |
Harvesting Information via API Event Monitoring
An adversary hosts an event within an application framework and then monitors the data exchanged during the course of the event for the purpose of harvesting any important data leaked during the transactions. One example could be harvesting lists of usernames or userIDs for the purpose of sending spam messages to those users. One example of this type of attack involves the adversary creating an event within the sub-application. Assume the adversary hosts a "virtual sale" of rare items. As other users enter the event, the attacker records via AiTM (CAPEC-94) proxy the user_ids and usernames of everyone who attends. The adversary would then be able to spam those users within the application using an automated script. |
Low |
| 477 |
Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content
An attacker exploits the underlying complexity of a data structure that allows for both signed and unsigned content, to cause unsigned data to be processed as though it were signed data. |
High |
| 65 |
Sniff Application Code
An adversary passively sniffs network communications and captures application code bound for an authorized client. Once obtained, they can use it as-is, or through reverse-engineering glean sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server. Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate with the server. [Set up a sniffer] The adversary sets up a sniffer in the path between the server and the client and watches the traffic. [Capturing Application Code Bound During Patching]adversary knows that the computer/OS/application can request new applications to install, or it periodically checks for an available update. The adversary loads the sniffer set up during Explore phase, and extracts the application code from subsequent communication. The adversary then proceeds to reverse engineer the captured code. |
High |
MITRE
Techniques
| id |
description |
| T1040 |
Network Sniffing |
| T1056.004 |
Input Capture: Credential API Hooking |
| © 2022 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. |
Mitigations
| id |
description |
| M1018 |
In cloud environments, ensure that users are not granted permissions to create or modify traffic mirrors unless this is explicitly required. |
| © 2022 The MITRE Corporation. Esta obra se reproduce y distribuye con el permiso de The MITRE Corporation. |
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