CVE-2025-59789

 

Uncontrolled recursion in the json2pb component in Apache bRPC (version < 1.15.0) on all platforms allows remote attackers to make the server crash via sending deep recursive json data. Root Cause: The bRPC json2pb component uses rapidjson to parse json data from the network. The rapidjson parser uses a recursive parsing method by default. If the input json has a large depth of recursive structure, the parser function may run into stack overflow. Affected Scenarios: Use bRPC server with protobuf message to serve http+json requests from untrusted network. Or directly use JsonToProtoMessage to convert json from untrusted input. How to Fix: (Choose one of the following options)  1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.15.0, which fixes this issue. 2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3099 Note: No matter which option you choose, you should know that the fix introduces a recursion depth limit with default value 100. It affects these functions:  ProtoMessageToJson, ProtoMessageToProtoJson, JsonToProtoMessage, and ProtoJsonToProtoMessage. If your requests contain json or protobuf messages that have a depth exceeding the limit, the request will be failed after applying the fix. You can modify the gflag json2pb_max_recursion_depth to change the limit.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59789

Categories

CWE-674 : Uncontrolled Recursion
The product does not properly control the amount of recursion that takes place, consuming excessive resources, such as allocated memory or the program stack. Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.) Ensure an end condition will be reached under all logic conditions. The end condition may include testing against the depth of recursion and exiting with an error if the recursion goes too deep. The complexity of the end condition contributes to the effectiveness of this action. Increase the stack size. Deeply nested arrays trigger stack exhaustion. Self-referencing pointers create infinite loop and resultant stack exhaustion. Javascript application accidentally changes input in a way that prevents a recursive call from detecting an exit condition. An attempt to recover a corrupted XML file infinite recursion protection counter was not always incremented missing the exit condition. USB-audio driver's descriptor code parsing allows unlimited recursion leading to stack exhaustion.

References


 

CPE

cpe start end


REMEDIATION




EXPLOITS


Exploit-db.com

id description date
No known exploits

POC Github

Url
No known exploits

Other Nist (github, ...)

Url
No known exploits


CAPEC


Common Attack Pattern Enumerations and Classifications

id description severity
230 Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
High
231 Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
High