CVE-2025-7783
Use of Insufficiently Random Values vulnerability in form-data allows HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP). This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/form_data.Js.
This issue affects form-data: < 2.5.4, 3.0.0 - 3.0.3, 4.0.0 - 4.0.3.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-7783
Categories
CWE-330 : Use of Insufficiently Random Values
The product uses insufficiently random numbers or values in a security context that depends on unpredictable numbers. Consider a PRNG that re-seeds itself as needed from high quality pseudo-random output sources, such as hardware devices. Use automated static analysis tools that target this type of weakness. Many modern techniques use data flow analysis to minimize the number of false positives. This is not a perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not feasible. Use products or modules that conform to FIPS 140-2 [REF-267] to avoid obvious entropy problems. Consult FIPS 140-2 Annex C ("Approved Random Number Generators"). Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. PHP framework uses mt_rand() function (Marsenne Twister) when generating tokens Cloud application on Kubernetes generates passwords using a weak random number generator based on deployment time. Crypto product uses rand() library function to generate a recovery key, making it easier to conduct brute force attacks. Random number generator can repeatedly generate the same value. Web application generates predictable session IDs, allowing session hijacking. Password recovery utility generates a relatively small number of random passwords, simplifying brute force attacks. Cryptographic key created with a seed based on the system time. Kernel function does not have a good entropy source just after boot. Blogging software uses a hard-coded salt when calculating a password hash. Bulletin board application uses insufficiently random names for uploaded files, allowing other users to access private files. Handheld device uses predictable TCP sequence numbers, allowing spoofing or hijacking of TCP connections. Web management console generates session IDs based on the login time, making it easier to conduct session hijacking. SSL library uses a weak random number generator that only generates 65,536 unique keys. Chain: insufficient precision causes extra zero bits to be assigned, reducing entropy for an API function that generates random numbers. Chain: insufficient precision (CWE-1339) inrandom-number generator causes some zero bits to be reliablygenerated, reducing the amount of entropy (CWE-331) CAPTCHA implementation does not produce enough different images, allowing bypass using a database of all possible checksums. DNS client uses predictable DNS transaction IDs, allowing DNS spoofing. Application generates passwords that are based on the time of day.
References
134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
7ffcee3d-2c14-4c3e-b844-86c6a321a158
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108
CPE
REMEDIATION
EXPLOITS
Exploit-db.com
| id |
description |
date |
|
| No known exploits |
POC Github
Other Nist (github, ...)
CAPEC
Common Attack Pattern Enumerations and Classifications
| id |
description |
severity |
| 112 |
Brute Force
In this attack, some asset (information, functionality, identity, etc.) is protected by a finite secret value. The attacker attempts to gain access to this asset by using trial-and-error to exhaustively explore all the possible secret values in the hope of finding the secret (or a value that is functionally equivalent) that will unlock the asset. [Determine secret testing procedure] Determine how a potential guess of the secret may be tested. This may be accomplished by comparing some manipulation of the secret to a known value, use of the secret to manipulate some known set of data and determining if the result displays specific characteristics (for example, turning cryptotext into plaintext), or by submitting the secret to some external authority and having the external authority respond as to whether the value was the correct secret. Ideally, the attacker will want to determine the correctness of their guess independently since involvement of an external authority is usually slower and can provide an indication to the defender that a brute-force attack is being attempted. [Reduce search space] Find ways to reduce the secret space. The smaller the attacker can make the space they need to search for the secret value, the greater their chances for success. There are a great many ways in which the search space may be reduced. [Expand victory conditions] It is sometimes possible to expand victory conditions. For example, the attacker might not need to know the exact secret but simply needs a value that produces the same result using a one-way function. While doing this does not reduce the size of the search space, the presence of multiple victory conditions does reduce the likely amount of time that the attacker will need to explore the space before finding a workable value. [Gather information so attack can be performed independently.] If possible, gather the necessary information so a successful search can be determined without consultation of an external authority. This can be accomplished by capturing cryptotext (if the goal is decoding the text) or the encrypted password dictionary (if the goal is learning passwords). |
High |
| 485 |
Signature Spoofing by Key Recreation
An attacker obtains an authoritative or reputable signer's private signature key by exploiting a cryptographic weakness in the signature algorithm or pseudorandom number generation and then uses this key to forge signatures from the original signer to mislead a victim into performing actions that benefit the attacker. |
High |
| 59 |
Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. [Find Session IDs] The attacker interacts with the target host and finds that session IDs are used to authenticate users. [Characterize IDs] The attacker studies the characteristics of the session ID (size, format, etc.). As a results the attacker finds that legitimate session IDs are predictable. [Match issued IDs] The attacker brute forces different values of session ID and manages to predict a valid session ID. [Use matched Session ID] The attacker uses the falsified session ID to access the target system. |
High |
MITRE
Techniques
| id |
description |
| T1110 |
Brute Force |
| T1552.004 |
Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys |
| © 2022 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. |
Mitigations
| id |
description |
| M1018 |
Proactively reset accounts that are known to be part of breached credentials either immediately, or after detecting bruteforce attempts. |
| M1022 |
Ensure permissions are properly set on folders containing sensitive private keys to prevent unintended access. Additionally, on Cisco devices, set the `nonexportable` flag during RSA key pair generation. |
| © 2022 The MITRE Corporation. Esta obra se reproduce y distribuye con el permiso de The MITRE Corporation. |
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