7.5 CVE-2025-8289

 

The Redirection for Contact Form 7 plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to PHP Object Injection in all versions up to, and including, 3.2.4 via deserialization of untrusted input in the delete_associated_files function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject a PHP Object. This vulnerability may be exploited by unauthenticated attackers when a form is present on the site with a file upload action, and doesn't affect sites with PHP version > 8. This vulnerability also requires the 'Redirection For Contact Form 7 Extension - Create Post' extension to be installed and activated in order to be exploited. No known POP chain is present in the vulnerable software, which means this vulnerability has no impact unless another plugin or theme containing a POP chain is installed on the site. If a POP chain is present via an additional plugin or theme installed on the target system, it may allow the attacker to perform actions like delete arbitrary files, retrieve sensitive data, or execute code depending on the POP chain present. We confirmed there is a usable gadget in Contact Form 7 plugin that makes arbitrary file deletion possible when installed with this plugin. Given Contact Form 7 is a requirement of this plugin, it is likely that any site with this plugin and the 'Redirection For Contact Form 7 Extension - Create Post' extension enabled is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8289

Categories

CWE-502 : Deserialization of Untrusted Data
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid. Marshaling and unmarshaling are effectively synonyms for serialization and deserialization, respectively. In Python, the "pickle" functionality is used to perform serialization and deserialization. Some PHP application researchers use this term when attacking unsafe use of the unserialize() function; but it is also used for CWE-915. Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.) If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified. When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe. Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization. Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation. Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed. Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481]. insecure deserialization in platform for managing AI/ML applications and models allows code execution via a crafted pickled object in a model file deserialization of untrusted YAML data in dashboard for data query and visualization of Elasticsearch data PHP object injection in WordPress plugin for AI-based SEO chain: bypass of untrusted deserialization issue (CWE-502) by using an assumed-trusted class (CWE-183) Deserialization issue in commonly-used Java library allows remote execution. Deserialization issue in commonly-used Java library allows remote execution. Use of PHP unserialize function on untrusted input allows attacker to modify application configuration. Use of PHP unserialize function on untrusted input in content management system might allow code execution. Use of PHP unserialize function on untrusted input in content management system allows code execution using a crafted cookie value. Content management system written in PHP allows unserialize of arbitrary objects, possibly allowing code execution. Python script allows local users to execute code via pickled data. Unsafe deserialization using pickle in a Python script. Web browser allows execution of native methods via a crafted string to a JavaScript function that deserializes the string.

References


 

CPE

cpe start end

REMEDIATION


EXPLOITS

Exploit-db.com

id description date
No known exploits

POC Github

Url
No known exploits

Other Nist (github, ...)

Url
No known exploits

CAPEC

Common Attack Pattern Enumerations and Classifications

id description severity
586 Object Injection
High