Malware Sys10
Sys10 is a backdoor that was used throughout 2013 by Naikon.
Platforms : Windows
Version : 1.1
Created : 31 May 2017
Last Modified : 18 March 2020
Version : 1.1
Created : 31 May 2017
Last Modified : 18 March 2020
List of techniques used :
id | description |
---|---|
T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route. Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to gather information about configurations and settings, such as IP addresses of configured interfaces and static/dynamic routes (e.g. show ip route, show ip interface). Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. |
T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from System Owner/User Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including whoami. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who. On macOS the dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_' command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as %USERNAME% and $USER, may also be used to access this information. On network devices, Network Device CLI commands such as `show users` and `show ssh` can be used to display users currently logged into the device. |
T1069.001 | Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group. Commands such as net localgroup of the Net utility, dscl . -list /Groups on macOS, and groups on Linux can list local groups. |
T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. Protocols such as HTTP/S and WebSocket that carry web traffic may be very common in environments. HTTP/S packets have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic. |
T1082 | System Information Discovery An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Tools such as Systeminfo can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to gather detailed system information (e.g. show version). System Information Discovery combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine. |
T1573.001 | Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4. |
List of groups using the malware :
id | description |
---|---|
G0019 | Naikon Naikon is assessed to be a state-sponsored cyber espionage group attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020). Active since at least 2010, Naikon has primarily conducted operations against government, military, and civil organizations in Southeast Asia, as well as against international bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches. |
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